2024-01 Contributions by a Judge to the Campaign Committee of a State’s Attorney Candidate
TOPIC
The propriety of a judge financially contributing to the campaign of a candidate for State’s Attorney and duty to recuse from proceedings involving the State’s Attorney to whom contributions were made.
DIGEST
A judge may financially contribute to the campaign of a candidate for State’s Attorney. Such a contribution, standing alone, does not disqualify the judge from presiding over matters prosecuted by the elected State’s Attorney.
REFERENCES
Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct of 2023 Rule 2.11, Rule 4.1(d)(1)(a), and Definition of “Political Organization” in the Terminology Section, IJEC Opinion 1994-06 and IJEC Opinion 1993-11
FACTS
A judge contributed $500.00 to a campaign committee of a county State’s Attorney candidate. The judge presides over criminal cases, and most of those cases are prosecuted by the office of the county’s State’s Attorney.
QUESTIONS
- Can a judge financially contribute to the campaign of a State’s Attorney candidate?
- Does a judge’s financial contribution to the campaign committee of a State’s Attorney candidate disqualify the judge from cases involving the State’s Attorney’s office if that candidate is elected?
OPINION
The judge is permitted by the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 4.1(D)(1) to make contributions to the campaign committee of a State’s Attorney candidate. That Rule provides:
(D) A judge or judicial candidate may, except as provided by law;
(1) at any time:
(a) purchase tickets for and attend political gatherings;
(b) identify as a member of a political party; and
(c) contribute to a political organization.
(Emphasis added.)
“Public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary is eroded if judges or judicial candidates are perceived to be subject to political influence.” Rule 4.1, comment [3]. The Code does, however, permit some activity in the political realm for judges, but pursuant to “narrowly tailored restrictions.” Rule 4.1, comment [1]. Consequently, some activities, such as serving in a leadership position in a political party or publicly endorsing candidates for public office, are expressly prohibited. Rule 4.1(A)(1), (2); see also Rule 4.1(d)(2) (specifying additional conduct permitted for candidates for judicial office). Conversely, the Code expressly permits other activities, such as purchasing tickets for and attending political gatherings and identifying as a member of a political party. Rule 4.1(D)(1). Judges also retain the right to participate in the political process as voters or by signing election-related petitions. Rule 4.1, comment [6].
A judge’s ability to financially contribute to a political campaign committee is another one of the activities which is expressly permitted by the Code. Rule 4.1(D)(c). The campaign committee for a State’s Attorney candidate constitutes a “political organization” to which judges may contribute pursuant to Rule 4.1(D)(1)(c). The Terminology Section of the Illinois Code defines “political organization” to mean a political party or other group sponsored by or affiliated with a political party or candidate, the principal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment of candidates for political office other than a judicial candidate’s campaign committee. See IJEC Opinion 1994-06 (Non-candidate Judge Contributing to a Candidate).
The ethical propriety of the judge contributing to a political campaign committee is, then, stated expressly in the Illinois Code. The next question is whether the judge’s contribution requires disqualification from hearing cases involving that State’s Attorney’s office if the candidate is elected. Illinois Code Rule 2.11(A) requires a judge to “disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” We find it useful to consider other situations which help explore what might lead to a judge’s impartiality being “reasonably” questioned.
First, in the reverse situation, would an attorney’s contribution to a judge’s election campaign give rise to an inference that the judge would favor that lawyer’s cases in litigation? We have previously answered that question in the negative, concluding that an attorney’s contribution to a judge’s campaign would not generally require the judge to recuse. IJEC Opinion 1993-11; but see Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884-885 (2009) (three-million-dollar contribution required recusal). If a lawyer’s contribution to the judge’s campaign does not disqualify the judge, some reasoned basis would have to be found to conclude that the judge’s contribution to a lawyer’s campaign would lead to a different result.
Second, the Committee does not believe that a financial campaign contribution, standing alone, presents a basis to infer some personal affinity for the candidate such that a reasonable impression of partiality would arise. At its core, a financial campaign contribution reflects the contributor’s view that the candidate is the best person to serve in the role of State’s Attorney—an important part of the justice system.
A campaign contribution is an indirect means to support a particular person to serve as State’s Attorney, but there are other circumstances in which a judge directly appoints an attorney to serve in the court system or in a particular case. In most counties in Illinois, public defenders are appointedby the circuit judges before whom they then practice. 55 ILCS 5/3-4004.1. Where the public defender has a conflict of interest, the court appoints private counsel to represent the defendant. 725 ILCS 5/113-3(b). In juvenile court, judges routinely appoint counsel to serve on their cases. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1). In the uncommon situation where a State’s Attorney is unable to serve, it is the court that appoints a replacement. 55 ILCS 5/3-9008. In all these situations, the attorneys appointed to serve will often litigate cases before the same judge or judges who appointed them.
We are aware of no argument that, once a judge appoints an attorney to serve, a reasonable question about the judge’s impartiality arises and necessitates the judge’s recusal from the attorney’s cases under Rule 2.11. In the Committee’s opinion, there is good reason for the absence of such argument. A judge appoints an attorney to serve in a particular case to ensure that the rights of an otherwise unrepresented party are protected. Similarly, circuit judges appoint a lawyer to serve in the role of public defender for a county to meet a vital need for representation of indigent defendants. In either case, the judgment that the appointee is qualified to serve is not a reflection of partiality in individual cases.
The same conclusions can be drawn when a judge contributes toward the election of a candidate for State’s Attorney. The office of the State’s Attorney is an important part of the justice system, and it is in the interest of the entire system that the State’s Attorney’s office function properly. While a judge does not directly appoint the State’s Attorney (in most situations), the judge’s campaign contribution reflects essentially the same thing as would an appointment: that the candidate is, in the judge’s view, best qualified to fill the office. The view that a particular person should be selected to serve a particular role in the judicial system is simply not the same as a preference for that person to prevail in individual cases.
Consequently, we conclude that the circumstances outlined in the inquiry do not indicate the judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned as a result of the campaign contribution. Nothing in the facts suggest bias. See IJEC Opinion 1993-11(campaign contributors are subject to public scrutiny because their contributions are a public record. The transparent nature of the contributions thus provides some assurance of judicial impartiality).
CONCLUSION
The contributions by the judge to the campaign committee of candidate for State’s Attorney are permitted by Illinois Code Rule 4.1(D)(1)(c). Under the facts present here, the judge would not be disqualified by Illinois Code Rule 2.11(A) from hearing cases involving the State’s Attorney candidate or the State’s Attorney’s office.
While judges can participate in the political process in the manner specifically permitted by the Code, still they must uphold the high standards of integrity required by their position. This means considering the amount of the contribution, its timing relative to proceedings, and the broader context in which the contribution is made. The facts of this inquiry, including the amount of the contributions (viewed from present-day and local norms), do not give rise to unusually heightened concerns about appearance of impropriety or partiality. Circumstances different from those present here would still require examination to determine if they give rise to a reasonable question as to the judge’s impartiality as a result of the contribution. The Committee expresses no opinion on the application of the Code to other possible scenarios.